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Mereological Nihilism and the 
Problem of Emergence 
 
Abstract:  
Mereological nihilism is the view that there are no composite objects; everything in existence is 
mereologically simple. The view is subject to a number of difficulties, one of which concerns 
what I call the problem of emergence. Very briefly, the problem is that nihilism seems to be 
incompatible with emergent properties; it seems to rule out their very possibility. This is a 
problem because there are good independent reasons to believe that emergent properties are 
possible. This paper provides a solution to the problem. I will show that nihilism and emergence 
are perfectly compatible, providing one accepts a novel understanding of how objects can 
instantiate properties; what I call irreducibly collective instantiation.  
 
§1. Introduction 
According to mereological nihilism (just ‘nihilism’ from here on) there are no composite objects. 
For the nihilist, everything that exists is mereologically simple, that is to say, has no proper parts. 
Nihilism is a controversial view and, despite something of a recent surge in popularity, it is 
subject to a number of serious objections. One of these objections concerns what I shall call the 
problem of emergence. In brief, the problem is that nihilism seems to be incompatible with the 
existence of emergent properties; it seems to rule out their very possibility. This is a problem 
because recent advancements in certain independent areas of study (such as the philosophy of 
mind and quantum physics) provide reasons to suggest that emergent properties are at the very 
least possible. In this paper I offer a solution to the problem. I will argue that nihilism and 
emergence are perfectly compatible providing one accepts a novel understanding of how 
properties are instantiated: what I call irreducibly collective instantiation. Along the way I will also aim 
to show that, contrary to much of what is written in the relevant literature, nihilism is not an 
absurd or ridiculous view, but rather, is a plausible and even compelling metaphysical thesis.  
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§ 2. Mereological Nihilism  
Mereological nihilism is the outright rejection of the relation of parthood. For the nihilist, 
nothing has parts, and nothing is a part. According to the nihilist, therefore, there are no 
composite objects; everything in existence is mereologically simple. The nihilist’s world is thus a 
sparse, Democritean one of just atoms and void. Nihilism is a most unpopular view. Rejected by 
many and endorsed by only few, it is usually viewed as being at best controversial, and at worst, 
absurd.1 The most commonly offered reason for rejecting nihilism is that it flies in the face of 
common sense. For according to common sense, the world is simply awash with composite 
objects. My car, for instance, has its wheels as parts. My house is composed of bricks and mortar. 
I myself am made up of all manner of different parts: hands, feet, eyes, ears, and so on. These 
statements express common sense platitudes, it is supposed, but according to the nihilist they are 
all false. For the nihilist, there are no cars; there are no houses; there are not even any human 
beings.2 It is for this reason – what I will call the common sense objection – that nihilism is often 
rejected out of hand as being evidently and obviously false. To give a few examples of the 
common sense objection in action, Michael Rea has said: “It just seems obvious that there are 
tables, chairs, computers and cars. The fact that some philosophical arguments suggest otherwise 
seems simply to be an indication that something has gone wrong with those arguments”.3 In a 
similar vein, Ned Markosian says: “according to my intuitions, there are simply far more 
composite objects in the world than nihilism allows. This seems to me to be a fatal objection to 
nihilism”.4 This sort of view, which is fairly prevalent in the literature, refuses to even take 
nihilism seriously. It is so evidently false, these naysayers maintain, that it fails to even get off the 
ground. 
 It is not one of the aims of this paper to convince the reader that nihilism is true – my 
arguments do not depend on it. For I am arguing only that nihilism and emergence are 
compatible. However, whilst my arguments do not depend on the truth of nihilism, I do think it 
is necessary to say something in response to the common sense objection. The reason for this is 
that if the common sense objection is right, and nihilism is evidently false, then the conclusion of 
this paper would be of very little consequence. Demonstrating that two theories are compatible 
is of very little interest if one of those theories is obviously false. Fortunately, and as I will 
presently show, I think there is good reason to be unconvinced by the common sense objection. 
It is simply not true, I maintain, to say that nihilism is evidently and obviously false.  
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 The main reason for this is that the nihilist has an easy and obvious strategy for 
explaining the apparent existence of the objects he eschews. For whilst the nihilist does deny the 
existence of ordinary composite objects like cars, houses, and human beings, he does not deny 
the existence of the matter that allegedly composes those objects. For example, take an ordinary 
table. According to common sense, a table is a composite object made of smaller parts which are 
arranged in a particular fashion and stand in certain spatio-temporal relations. At base, those 
parts will be very, very small indeed; some kind of microscopic, fundamental particles (quarks 
and leptons, or what have you). Now here’s the point. The nihilist can agree with this latter claim; 
he too accepts the existence of these microscopic, fundamental particles, and he too agrees about 
the way in which they are arranged, and the spatio-temporal relations in which they stand. All he 
disagrees about is that they compose a single, composite object – a table. When seen in this light, 
the disagreement between the nihilist and his opponents is a lot more subtle than it may initially 
appear. 
As it happens, the debate is actually very seldom seen in this light. One of the reasons for 
this, and for why nihilism seems to be at such sharp odds with common sense is the somewhat 
loaded way in which the objections to it are often phrased. Opponents to nihilism are apt to say, 
in incredulous tones, things like: “but if your view is right, that means there are no tables and 
chairs!” Statements like these, when so baldly asserted, do give the impression that nihilism is 
patently absurd. For the claim that “there are no tables and chairs”, when taken at face value, 
would have us believe that we have no surfaces to put things on, and nowhere to sit down; it 
would have us believe that the world around us is nothing but a mere illusion. But of course 
nihilism doesn’t entail that! If it did, then we would be right to reject it as absurd. But as we well 
know, the nihilist can sit down just as comfortably as anyone else; he merely maintains that what 
he is sitting on is not a single, composite object (a chair), but a plurality of small, simple objects 
(particles arranged chair-wise). 5  Once this is recognised, the conflict between nihilism and 
common sense begins to lose its bite. In fact, it is not clear that there is a conflict with common 
sense at all, or so it seems to me.  For when faced with what is ordinarily recognised as a table, 
for example, both parties (i.e. the nihilist and his opponent) agree about what physical matter lies 
before them (i.e. a vast quantity of microphysical particles arranged in tabular form). The only 
thing they disagree about is the compositional status of that matter, that is, whether those particles 
compose something. And it’s not at all obvious that the compositional status of matter is 
something that common sense tells us an awful lot about. As an analogy, suppose you were 
attending a football match with a friend, and were part of a crowd fifty-thousand strong. Now 
suppose that both you and your friend agreed that the fifty-thousand people existed, but you 
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disagreed on whether there was another entity – the crowd – which those people composed. 
This would appear to be a legitimate debate, but it’s not at all obvious what the common sense 
resolution to it would be. At the very least, it certainly doesn’t seem absurd to insist that there is 
no singular entity – a crowd – which exists in addition to the people attending the match. It 
would be quite reasonable, or so it seems to me, for one to insist that there is no actual thing to 
which we refer when we speak of “the crowd”, but merely the fifty-thousand individuals 
congregated in close proximity. To put it another way, suppose one were asked the question: 
how many individual objects are present in this scenario – 50,000 (just the people), or 50,001 
(the people and the crowd)?6 It seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that it is the former 
answer which is correct. But of course, the same could quite easily be said about a table. Thus it 
shouldn’t seem particularly radical, or absurd, to suggest that there is no table over and above the 
multitude of atoms that are arranged table-wise. As Ted Sider has said, denying there are tables in 
addition to particles arranged table-wise “is no more absurd than denying that holes exist in 
addition to perforated surfaces, or denying that smirks exist in addition to smirking faces”. 7 
Quite so. 
It is because of this that the common sense objection does not pose much of a threat to 
the nihilist. The postulation of microphysical simples, arranged in the appropriate ways and 
standing in the appropriate spatio-temporal relations, is quite sufficient for the nihilist to be able 
to explain the world of appearances. Denying that those simples stand in any relations of 
parthood does not, despite insistences to the contrary, create any serious tension with the 
dictates of common sense. This does not mean that nihilism is true, of course; independent and 
compelling arguments would be required to justify that belief. But what it does mean is that 
nihilism should not be dismissed solely on the basis of the common sense objection; it is not 
obviously false. It deserves to be taken more seriously than that.  
 
§ 3. The Problem of Emergence 
Having dispensed with the common sense objection to nihilism, I now turn to the central focus 
of this paper: the problem of emergence. In order to understand the problem, it is first necessary 
to understand exactly what is meant by the term ‘emergent property’. To begin with a rough 
gloss, we can say that an emergent property is a property of an object or system that cannot be 
explained or accounted for solely in terms of the properties of that object’s or system’s 
constituent parts. It is in this sense that emergent properties are often said to be ‘novel’, in that 
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they are taken to be something entirely distinct from the properties of their bearer’s basal 
constituents. To give a commonly used example, it is often suggested that the phenomenal 
properties of conscious experience are emergent. The actual phenomenal experience of elation, 
for example, is taken to be entirely distinct from and irreducible to, the electro-chemical 
properties of the brain which underpin it. These properties emerge at a certain level and cannot be 
reduced to properties instantiated by objects at a lower level. To borrow a quote from Paul 
Davies, by recognising emergence one “recognises that in physical systems, the whole is often 
more than the sum of its parts. That is to say, at each new level of complexity, new and often 
surprising qualities emerge that cannot, in any straightforward manner, be attributed to known 
properties of the constituents”.8  
 With even this rough conception of emergent properties, the problem they pose for the 
nihilist soon becomes apparent. This is because, according to the nihilist there are no complex 
systems or objects at all, and thus there are no different levels of complexity. There are 
mereological simples and that’s it. So if emergent properties are supposed to emerge only at 
higher levels of complexity (i.e. higher than the base level), then for the nihilist, there is nowhere 
for them to emerge. There is simply no place for emergent properties in a nihilistic ontology, 
because there are no candidate objects available to instantiate them.  
 There is a sizeable literature on the nature of emergent properties, and there is great 
debate over how they are best understood or best characterised. Some, for instance, think that 
emergent properties supervene on the intrinsic properties of their bearer’s parts, whereas others 
claim that this supervenience fails.9 Some think that emergence is best cashed out in terms of 
causation, such that emergent properties are those whose causal powers are quite distinct from 
the causal powers of their bearer’s parts.10 Others have claimed that emergence is best explained 
in terms of predictability, such that emergent properties are those that cannot be predicted to 
arise, even in principle, solely from a knowledge of the properties of the bearer’s basic 
constituents.11 And very recently it has been suggested that emergence can be explained in terms 
of the currently fashionable notions of fundamentality and ontological dependence, such that emergent 
entities are those which are fundamental, yet which are not ontologically independent. 12 
However, despite the great differences between the many and varied accounts of emergence (and 
the few I have mentioned barely scratch the surface of the whole body of literature), there is a 
clear theme common to them all. That is, according to all these competing accounts, a stratified 
picture of the world is presupposed, whereby reality comes divided up into different levels of 
complexity. This is because, on all accounts of emergence, it is accepted that emergent properties 
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are taken to emerge only at higher levels of complexity than the base level, and that they are not 
reducible to, or explainable solely in terms of, properties instantiated at lower levels. But, of 
course, this can only be the case if there are multiple levels of complexity to begin with. And this 
is one of the very things that the nihilist denies! Central to the nihilist’s view is an outright 
rejection of this stratification of reality. For the nihilist there is only one level, and everything that 
exists falls within it: there are mereological simples and nothing else. This is because the nihilist’s 
stance is not merely reductionist, in that it aims to reduce all complex objects and their properties to 
simple objects and their properties, but it is robustly eliminativist, in that it aims to eliminate all 
complex objects and their properties altogether. All appearances of complex objects and higher-
level systems are to be completely explained away. But this seems to entail that the nihilist cannot 
accept even the possibility of emergent properties. For if nihilism is true, there are no higher-
level objects or complex systems available to instantiate them. Quite simply, there is nowhere for 
emergent properties to emerge. 
 If this is right, and nihilism is incompatible with the possibility of emergent properties, 
then it spells real trouble for the nihilist. This is because there are a number of good reasons to 
believe that emergent properties are possible. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that they 
are actual. The most common forum within contemporary philosophy in which emergent 
properties are postulated is the philosophy of mind. For it is often thought that there are certain 
aspects of consciousness that are emergent, i.e. that cannot be reduced purely to properties of 
cerebral cells. The thought is that intentional properties or mental states (things like qualia) are so 
entirely distinct in character from the neurological, electro-chemical properties that are 
instantiated by the fundamental parts of the brain, that they cannot be explicable purely in terms 
of those properties. The intense throb of a pain, for instance, or a sharp pang of remorse, are 
simply not the kind of things that can be reduced to mere electro-chemical properties of neural 
cells, or so it is plausibly thought. They may well be caused by neural activity, but they emerge 
holistically as being far greater than the sum of their causal beginnings.  
Another quite distinct field in which emergence is playing an increasingly prominent role 
is fundamental physics. Quantum mechanics, for instance, acknowledges the existence of certain 
composite quantum objects or systems (often referred to as ‘entangled systems’) which often 
exhibit properties that are quite inexplicable in terms of the object’s/system’s sub-atomic 
constituents alone. As explained by Tim Maudlin, “in quantum theory, then, the physical state of 
a complex whole cannot always be reduced to those of its parts, or to those of its parts together 
with their spatiotemporal relations. [...] The result of the most intensive scientific investigations 
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in history is a theory that contains an ineliminable holism.”13 This means that one of our most 
promising scientific theories recognises entities that are irreducibly holistic; that have properties 
which are not derivable purely from the intrinsic properties of the entity’s parts and the 
spatiotemporal relations in which they stand. One clear way of explaining this phenomenon is to 
maintain that these holistic properties are emergent, in that they emerge at the system-level and 
constitute something quite over and above any mere summation of the properties of the system’s 
constituents. 
 This all constitutes trouble for the nihilist. If some of our best theories of consciousness 
and fundamental physics imply the existence of emergent properties, yet nihilism rules out their 
very possibility, then so much the worse for nihilism. It would take a brave philosopher to reject 
the truth of quantum mechanics on the basis of his conviction in nihilism. But it should also be 
noted that emergence is quite a contentious phenomenon, and even in the afore-mentioned 
fields, the postulation of emergent properties remains controversial. It is by no means a widely 
accepted fact that there are aspects of conscious experience or holistic quantum properties which 
are genuinely emergent. However, the contentious nature of emergence does little to defuse the 
problem it poses for the nihilist. This is because, regardless of whether emergent properties are 
possible or not, it seems to go way beyond the jurisdiction of the nihilist to dictate the case one 
way or the other from his armchair. It may or may not be the case that the holistic properties of 
entangled systems are genuinely emergent properties, for instance, but whatever the case may be, 
it is surely best to leave the verdict in the hands of physicists; it is surely not for the nihilist to 
decide. Thus it should be seen as a significant cost – indeed, perhaps a prohibitive cost – of 
nihilism if it is to lay such heavy demands on various independent debates by ruling out the very 
possibility of emergent properties.  
 The problem I have just outlined has received very little attention in print. The only 
precise articulation of it that I know of is to be found in a 2007 paper by Jonathan Schaffer.14, 15 
Perhaps more pertinently, there is also a distinct lack of satisfactory solutions. Schaffer (2007) 
himself offers a solution, which is to endorse monism. Monism is a particularly radical form of 
nihilism according to which there is only a single concrete object in existence: the world itself. 
On this view, the world is taken to be a single, giant simple. I will not give this proposed solution 
any further consideration here simply because monism is such a controversial and unpopular 
view.16 Indeed, much of the literature on nihilism fails to even recognise that monism is a version 
of nihilism at all. Rather, it is often simply assumed that nihilism postulates a vast number of 
simples which are microscopic in size. Moreover, it should be noted that Schaffer himself does 
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not endorse monism, branding it “a crazy view”. Indeed, Schaffer’s line of argument is to 
conclude that nihilism must be false because the only version of it that is compatible with 
emergence is monism, yet monism is clearly and obviously false. In what follows, I will present a 
solution to the problem of emergence that does not require the endorsement of monism.  
 
§ 4. The Proposed Solution: Collective Instantiation 
In order to respond to the problem of emergence, I think the nihilist should first consider the 
following question: why should the existence of emergent properties necessarily imply the 
existence of composite objects? In other words, just because new properties emerge at the 
macroscopic level, does this necessarily require that there must also be objects at that level in order 
to instantiate them? The solution I wish to propose answers ‘no’ to this question. Instead, I think 
the nihilist should insist that particles can collectively instantiate certain properties, even though 
those properties are not reducible to, or explainable in terms of, the properties each of the 
particles instantiates individually.  
Central to the idea I am proposing is the claim that instantiation need not be a one-one 
relation.17 That is to say, it needn’t always hold between a single object and a single property. 
Rather, we should allow that instantiation can be a many-one relation, in that many objects can, 
collectively, instantiate a single property. One may say, for instance, that the xs collectively 
instantiate F. Now it is very important to note that in saying this I do not mean that the set (or 
any other collective term) of xs instantiates F, and neither do I mean that each of the xs 
instantiates F individually. Rather, plainly and simply, the xs collectively instantiate F. To 
illustrate what I mean, there is an analogy that can be drawn here with the thesis that composition is 
identity (CAI), which states that composite objects are identical to their parts taken together.18 In 
order to make sense of CAI, one has to adopt a somewhat different understanding of the 
relation of identity than that which is classically recognised. Proponents of CAI take identity to 
be a many-one relation. So when one says that a composite object is identical to its parts, one is 
not saying that it is identical to the sum of its parts (for that is just a case of self-identity), nor is 
one saying that it is identical to each of its individual parts (for that would be absurd). Rather, one 
is saying that it is identical to its parts collectively; the many parts collectively stand in the relation 
of identity to the one whole. I wish to employ the same kind of idea here, but concerning 
instantiation rather than identity. 
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Once this notion of collective instantiation is recognised, it is fairly straightforward to 
show how it can be employed to overcome the problem of emergence. Let me give an example. 
Consider an ordinary composite object: my cat, Brian. The nihilist, remember, will not accept 
that Brian exists, because he does not believe there are any composite objects at all.  However, 
he does accept that there are a certain number of microscopic simple particles that do exist, and 
that are arranged in a particular way (arranged cat-wise), and that engage in particular collective, 
feline activities. It is the existence of these particles, he says, that explains the apparent existence 
of the composite object, Brian. Moreover, he will say, all of Brian’s alleged macroscopic 
properties (his mass, his shape, his colour, etc.) can be explained perfectly well by appealing only 
to those particles, the intrinsic properties they each instantiate, and the relations in which they 
stand. This is how the nihilist deals with the apparent abundance of macroscopic composite 
objects. But now suppose that Brian also instantiates some emergent property. Let’s say it is some 
mental state, and let’s call it F. In this case, appealing solely to the particles’ individual properties 
and their inter-relations will not be enough to explain the existence of F. Precisely because F is 
emergent, it is not reducible to some mere conjunction of the intrinsic properties of its bearer’s 
parts – that is, after all, in the very nature of an emergent property. In other words, an 
explanation of the individual particles and their individual properties will not be enough to 
explain the existence of F. However, if the nihilist is armed with a notion of collective 
instantiation, this does not represent a problem. For he can merely say that the particles arranged 
cat-wise collectively instantiate F. No one of the individual particles instantiates F, and neither is 
there any composite whole that instantiates F; indeed no single object instantiates F at all. 
Rather, the particles collectively instantiate F. Thus F emerges at a certain point, when some 
plurality of particles are arranged, and interact, in a certain way, but crucially, no single object – 
no composite object – is required in order to instantiate it. The emergence of F is therefore quite 
compatible with the absence of composite objects. 
This strategy can be employed by the nihilist to explain the occurrence of any alleged 
emergent property. At the sub-atomic level, for instance, if some entangled quantum system is 
supposed to exhibit some holistic property, F, then the nihilist has no need to recognise the 
existence of the system itself in order to explain this phenomenon, but can merely maintain that 
the particles that allegedly compose the system collectively instantiate F. And the same is the case 
with any alleged instance of emergence, at the microscopic or macroscopic level. If particles are 
capable of collectively instantiating single properties, then there is no pressure to accept that 
those particles must be parts of a composite object, even if the properties they collectively 
instantiate are emergent.  
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One thing that is very important to note here is that the notion of collective instantiation 
I am proposing is very much irreducible. That is to say, if some particles collectively instantiate 
some property, F, in the sense I am proposing, then one will not be able to explain this in a 
reductive fashion by referring solely to the properties of the individual particles. Rather, it must 
be accepted as a brute and unanalyzable fact that this collective instantiation occurs. The fact that 
these particles instantiate F will resist any further illumination or explanation. This irreducibility 
is required in order to deal with the problem of emergence, precisely because emergent 
properties are themselves irreducible by nature. Of course, this will leave open the quite 
mysterious question of why emergent properties emerge when they do. But whilst this question is 
certainly somewhat mysterious, it does not present a problem unique to my proposed solution, 
but rather presents a problem with emergence in general. Even if one accepts the existence of 
composite objects, the question of why emergent properties emerge when they do remains.  
 
§ 5. Making Sense of Collective Instantiation 
What sense can one make of irreducibly collective instantiation? Just how plausible a suggestion 
is it that many objects can collectively instantiate a single property, even though none of the 
objects individually instantiate that property? I would suggest that it is a most plausible 
suggestion, and one that we can make perfect sense of. Firstly, I should say that it seems a lot 
more plausible than the central idea involved in composition as identity: that many objects can 
collectively be identical to a single object. Many philosophers think, and I include myself in this 
group, that CAI is logically incoherent. Many objects simply cannot be identical to a single object 
because the many objects have different properties to the single object. As David Lewis 
succinctly put it, “what’s true of the many is not exactly what’s true of the one. After all, they are 
many while it is one”.19 But as Leibniz told us, what have different properties must be distinct, 
therefore whatever relation the many stand in to the one, it cannot be identity.  
Collective instantiation, by contrast, is not subject to any such obvious logical difficulties. 
There is no logical contradiction involved in supposing that many objects can collectively 
instantiate a single property. In fact, in ordinary language we talk as though such a thing happens 
all the time. Consider, for example, the following sentences: 
S1: “The swans on the lake are white” 
S2: “The swans on the lake surround the central island” 
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Both of these sentences involve collective predication, since they involve a predicate (“are white” 
and “surround the central island”) being satisfied by a collection of things (the swans on the 
lake). But there are some important differences between the two. In S1, whilst the predication is 
collective, it is also reducibly so. That is to say, the predicate is collectively satisfied in virtue of it 
being individually satisfied by each of the swans. All of the swans are white because each of the 
swans is white. Thus in order to understand S1 we do not need to recognise that any sort of 
collective instantiation is going on – it is simply a case of many things individually instantiating 
the same property.  
 S2, however, is different. The predication involved here is irreducibly collective. It is not 
the case that the predicate is satisfied collectively in virtue of it being satisfied by each of the 
individual swans. No individual swan surrounds the central island, they do so only collectively. 
Moreover, in understanding S2, at no point are we tempted to think (or so I shall presume) that 
there is some single thing (some kind of swan-fusion) that satisfies the predicate. Rather, we 
simply understand that they do so collectively – the many swans collectively surround the central 
island. What this suggests is that we already have some kind of intuitive grasp on what 
irreducibly collective instantiation involves. In ordinary thought and talk we already seem to 
recognise that many things can collectively, but irreducibly, have certain properties.  
 I should make it clear that I am not suggesting that collective predication and collective 
instantiation are one and the same thing; they are not. One is a linguistic phenomenon, while the 
other is a worldly, or metaphysical, phenomenon. But there are clearly similarities between the 
two. And if we can make perfect sense of the former, which we clearly can, that might be good 
reason to think we make equally good sense of the latter. What I am meaning to impress, then, is 
that the notion of irreducibly collective instantiation that I am proposing is not some 
metaphysical oddity, but something quite intuitive and plausible. It is not something that should 
raise any particular suspicions.  
Finally, I need to say at least a little bit more about instantiation in general. So far, I have 
been talking of instantiation as being a relation that holds between particulars and properties. But 
this is quite a controversial view, for it is well-known that there are many problems associated 
with it, perhaps most notably, the threat of Bradley’s regress. However, as I mentioned earlier, 
my proposed solution does not depend on this relational understanding of instantiation. In fact, 
the solution is intended to be fairly neutral in that respect, and thus compatible with all manner 
of views on how properties are instantiated. Some, for instance, like Armstrong and Strawson, 
have claimed that instantiation is not a relation at all, but rather, some kind of fundamental (and 
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non-relational) nexus or tie.20 But as far as this view is acceptable at all, there seems no reason 
why it cannot be extended to include collective instantiation. That is, if it is theoretically 
acceptable to have a non-relational nexus linking a single object to a single property, then there 
seems no obvious reason to say why such a nexus could not link many objects to a single 
property (even though none of those objects were linked individually to that property). 
Alternatively, one might be suspicious of instantiation altogether, and reject the claim that there 
is any thing which links particulars to their properties at all. On this view, particulars would 
simply have certain properties, and that is all there is to it. But once again, there doesn’t appear to 
be any obvious reason for this view to exclude the proposed solution. That is, if one accepts that 
a single object can just have a property, without there being any intermediary required to link the 
two, then it is only a short leap to accept that many objects can just have a single property in the 
same way. (Of course, it must be remembered that we are not saying that many objects 
individually have the property in question – they don’t – but that they collectively have it). In 
short, what I am suggesting is that regardless of one’s favoured view of how properties are 
instantiated, there should in principle be some acceptable modification of that view possible 
whereby it can be employed collectively.  
 
§ 6. Concluding Remarks 
I have argued that, contrary to what some have thought, mereological nihilism is quite 
compatible with emergence. If one accepts that particles can collectively instantiate properties, 
then there is no pressure to acknowledge composite objects in order to explain emergent 
properties, and thus the problem of emergence entirely disappears. Irreducibly collective 
instantiation allows that properties can emerge at the macroscopic level, even if there are no 
objects at that level to instantiate them. Moreover, I hope to have shown that collective 
instantiation is a plausible and even intuitive notion; one that we can easily make sense of, and in 
fact, one that we already seem to have an implicit grasp of, if ordinary language is anything to go 
by. Finally, I have argued that this solution is neutral with regard to the independent question of 
how properties are instantiated. Whatever one’s view is of how objects instantiate properties, 
there should be a plausible and unproblematic modification of that view whereby they can be 
instantiated collectively. Overall, then, irreducibly collective instantiation serves to make nihilism 
a more plausible view. Whatever problems the nihilist may face, emergence is not one of them.  
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§ 7. Notes 
                                                          
1 Defenders of nihilism include Cameron (2010) and Sider (2013). 
2 Of course, nihilism only rules out the existence of such things if they are taken to be composite. The 
nihilist is perfectly entitled to accept the existence of cars, houses and humans (as well as any other 
type of object), providing he also insists that they are mereologically simple. But asserting that cars, 
for instance, are mereologically simple would probably not serve to make the view any more 
amenable to common sense.  
3 Rea (1998, p.348) 
4 Markosian (1998a, p.221) 
5 The locution “arranged x-wise” was introduced by van Inwagen (1990, p.109) 
6 I am supposing, for sake of simplicity, that each person counts as a single entity.  
7 Sider (2013, p.238) 
8 Davies (2006, x) 
9 Crane (2001), for example, argues that emergent properties do supervene on the properties of their 
bearer’s parts. Schaffer (2007),  McDaniel (2008), and O’Connor (2000), however, all claim the 
opposite.  
10 E.g. Crane (2001).  
11 This is the more traditional view of emergence, endorsed by, among others, D.C. Broad (1923). 
12 Barnes (2012) 
13 Maudlin (1998, p.56) 
14 Schaffer (2007, pp.184-187). Arguably, however, the rough core of the problem can be found in van 
Inwagen (1990). Van Inwagen sets out a radically eliminativist ontology in which he rejects the 
existence of the vast majority of ordinary composite objects. He stops short of eliminating living 
organisms, however, and one of his main reasons for doing so is that he claims that consciousness 
cannot be reduced to the properties of the fundamental parts of the brain, nor can it be explained as a 
mere collective activity of those parts. Van Inwagen does not state that he takes consciousness to be 
an emergent phenomenon; indeed emergence is not mentioned at all. But he does seem to take 
consciousness to be in some sense holistic, or irreducible, and as such, incompatible with a 
thoroughgoing mereological nihilism.  
15 Sider (2013, p.244n) also recognises the problem, albeit very briefly. His response, which is given 
equally briefly, is to deny that there are any genuinely emergent properties.  
16 It has a rich philosophical history, of course, tracing right back to Parmenides, but is much less 
popular today. For a current endorsement of monism, see Horgan & Potrc (2000; 2008). 
17 In what follows, I will be talking of instantiation as a relation; one that holds between particulars 
and properties. I am aware that to many this will seem objectionable, as there are many problems 
associated with taking instantiation to be a relation. However, this way of talking is just for purposes 
of expediency and clarity. The idea that I am proposing – that properties can be instantiated 
collectively – does not depend on this relational understanding of instantiation. Rather, I think that 
the solution I am proposing is neutral with regard to how properties are instantiated. I will say more 
on this later. 
18 For a defence of CAI see Baxter (1988) 
19 Lewis (1991, p.87) 
20 See Armstrong (1989) and Strawson (1959) 
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